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THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND
CONTRACTUALLY IMPLIED PROPERTY





In recent years numerous writers have charted the evolution
of the American economy as businesses have divested assets
and completely closed facilities.' The results of these deci-
sions have been discussed at length elsewhere and are known
to include such symptoms as chronic unemployment, reduced
incomes, loss of savings and other property, and physical and
mental health problems such as alcoholism, physical abuse, di-
vorce and even suicide. 2
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1980; M.A., Rutgers University, 1982; M.A., SUNY Binghamton, 1986; Ph.D., Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1989.
tt Student at William Mitchell College of Law and associate editor of the law
review 1989-90; B.A., Northern Illinois University, 1981.
1. See, e.g., M. SKIDMORE, A LOOK AT FOUR PLANT SHUTDOWNS IN MINNESOTA 1
(1985) (a report published by the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, University
of Minnesota); Look What Happened to Pensions When a Tractor Plant Closed, 28 MACHIN-
IST 12 (March 22, 1973); see also Comment, The Use of Eminent Domain to Prevent an
Industrial Plant Shutdown: The Next Step in an Expanding Power?, 49 ALB. L. REV. 95, 97 &
n. 11 (1984) (citing Idle Mills, A Dearth of Hope Are Features of Ohio's Steel Towns, Wall St.
J., Jan. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (community impact of shutdown of two steel mills);
Chavez, When Arco Left Town, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1982, § 3, at 1, col. I (twenty-five
percent of town's workforce put out of work due to plant closing); Once an Industry Hot
Spot, Chester, Pa., Hits Bad Times, Wall St. J., Jan*. 26, 1981, at 23, col. 4 (city suffers
economic distress after shipbuilders shutdown operation); Barker, There Is a Better
Way, 32 LAB. L.J. 453, 454 (1981) (sudden plant closings occurring with alarming
frequency and causing devastating economic, social and personal impacts); B. BLUE-
STONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS,
COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY 276 (1982)
(the author presents a table by regions within the country of manufacturing plant
transfers during the 1970's by 410 large U.S. corporations)).
2. See, e.g., B. HARRISON & B. BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE RE-
STRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 63-64 (1988); see also Comment, supra
note 1, at 97-98 n.16 (citing B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 1, at 51-65
(corporate shutdowns causing blue-collar workers to lose their middle-class lifes-
tyles); Kasi, Gore & Cobb, The Experience of Losing a Job: Reported Changes in Health,
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A business decision to close a facility has a tremendous im-
pact on both individuals and communities. Sometimes this im-
pact will not remain localized but be felt across a large
geographic area if the employer is big enough and the area is
sparsely populated. A case in point is the gradual demise of
the taconite3 mining industry now occurring across the "Iron
Range" 4 of north-central Minnesota. Northern Minnesota is a
sparsely populated area that, until recent years, enjoyed some
measure of economic security. This security was provided, in
large part, by the large mining companies operating in the
area. These companies mined taconite, an element used in the
production of steel. For many years the taconite mines of
northern Minnesota were primary suppliers to the steel mills
located in Chicago, Illinois and Gary, Indiana. These mills in
turn supplied steel to Detroit for the domestic auto industry.
This web of economic interdependence and prosperity has
nearly come to an end in northern Minnesota with the substitu-
tion of cheaper, imported taconite from Brazil. The employers
have almost all departed now and the area has been left in a
state of environmental and economic chaos. This chaos has
been well documented and includes widespread social
problems such as chronic unemployment, an increase in the
demand for public services occurring while tax bases are
shrinking, an out-migration of population, a decrease in real
estate values, a loss of secondary businesses, and a general
blow to community pride. 5
Symptoms and Illness Behavior, 37 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 106, 118-21 (1975) (report on
job loss causing stress, depression and various physical symptoms)).
3. Taconite is "a flint like rock containing granules of iron oxide; specif, this rock
when high enough in iron content to become commercially valuable as an ore."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2326 (1976).
4. The "Range" is actually a line of low-lying hills beginning around Grand
Rapids, Minnesota and extending in a north-easterly direction to approximately Bab-
bitt, Minnesota.
5. For articles chronicling these and other tragedies on the Range, see generally
Ford Action Deals a Blow to Eveleth Mines, St. Paul Dispatch, Sept. 15, 1983, § C, at 4,
col. 1 (Ford Motor Co. closes its steel subsidiary and further jeopardizes mines in
Eveleth, Minn.); Uncertainty Rules on Iron Range, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Feb. 13, 1983,
§ 0, at 7, col. 1 (80 percent of the iron mining and taconite production workforce
laid-off in Minnesota's Iron Range); Tough Economy Not Goodfor Your Heath, St. Paul
Dispatch, May 24, 1982, § C, at 1, col. 2 (mine shutdowns on Iron Range causing
stress leading to ulcers, aggravation of coronary ailments and rashes); Mine Layoffs
Cast Dark Shadow on Iron Range, St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 2, 1982, § C, at 1, col. 1
(six of eight Iron Range taconite plants scheduling shutdowns which will cause over
65 percent of workforce to be laid-off at least part of 1982 summer months).
[Vol. 16
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When faced with the prospect of an employer leaving, a
community may feel entirely unable to affect that business de-
cision. Recently, several options have been suggested that can
be used to challenge business decisions that cause plants to be
closed. One option typically chosen by unions is to attempt to
reach a negotiated settlement with the employer on the clos-
ing.6 The usefulness of this option is limited, however, be-
cause it is generally available only in unionized settings. Even
in those settings, negotiations producing an actual agreement
are few and far between.
7
Another method to affect a plant closing decision is to adopt
legislation regulating the closing process. Typically this legis-
lation requires advance notification for either a major layoff or
a complete closing.8 The goal of this legislation is to cushion
6. While it is not the purpose of this article to pursue this option in detail, the
option is most often exercised pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & (d) (1982). Section 158(d) requires "the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). This language has been interpreted to require employers to bargain with
employees about the "effects" of a shutdown, such as severance pay, pensions and
benefits. It does not, however, give employees a specific remedy to prevent the shut-
down. Memorandum of the Institute for Public Representation, Power of New Bed-
ford, Massachusetts, to Acquire the Morse Cutting Tools Plant Through Eminent
Domain 2 (May 18, 1984) (prepared by A. Buchsbaum, A. Haft & D. Parker). See also
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981) (bargaining over
management decision affecting continued availability of employment is required only
if benefit for labor relations outweighs burden placed on the conduct of the busi-
ness); Textile Workers of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965)
(employer closing business due to vindictiveness toward the union is not unfair labor
practice).
7. See Comment, Eminent Domain: The Ability of a Community to Retain an Industry in
the Face of an Attempted Shut Down or Relocation, 12 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 231, 232 n.5
(1985), which states that "less than a quarter of the American workforce is unionized,
and of those, only 13 percent of 400 sampled contracts placed any limitation on clos-
ings or relocations." (citing Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects on Employees-the
Need for New Remedies, 35 LAB. LJ. 268, 269 (1984)). In the same footnote, the author
also cites the I NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, EMPLOYEE AND UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO
LABOR LAw 4.01 n.2 (1984) as a source of cases where contract provisions barring
runaway shops can be found.
8. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2109 (West Supp. 1990) (the recently passed
federal plant closing notification law); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 182 (West
Supp. 1989) (company closing plant must give the "longest practicable advance no-
tice" to employees); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 15 1A, § 71B (West Supp. 1989) (no-
tice given by company closing plant to director of employment security who, in turn,
notifies the union of the closing); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West 1988) (advance
notice required for mergers, liquidations, dispositions, relocations or cessation of
operations affecting employees); see also PLANT CLOSING LEGISLATION (Key Issues No.
1990]
3
Schultz: The Use of Eminent Domain and Contractually Implied Property Righ
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
the disruption individuals and communities experience when
jobs are lost. Unfortunately, these statutes usually require only
a few months notice and the payment of limited economic ben-
efits, if any, to affected workers. Furthermore, they do not di-
rectly address the impact of the closing on the health of the
whole community.
While these options may cushion the impact felt by employ-
ees, they cannot actually prevent a plant closing or compensate
a community for the socio-economic losses that flow from
these types of business decisions. However, two additional
options are available to accomplish these goals. First, the com-
munity can oppose a plant closing by claiming the infringe-
ment of a contractually implied property right.9 The second
option involves using eminent domain power to accomplish
the same goal. Both options would be exercised by the com-
munity itself, as a government, or by some other governmental
entity.
This article offers communities two innovative options for
affecting what otherwise is a unilateral business decision to re-
move assets from a community.' 0 Four case studies are
27-New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University)
(A. Aboud 1984) (report on the use of legislation as a response to the severe impact
of plant closings).
9. While the more popular or frequently suggested name for this right is a
"community property right," we have adopted our language to avoid confusion with
other legal terms. Also, our language is a more accurate description of the legal
cause of action that a party can bring on this issue.
10. At this juncture it is important to note a fundamental tension between the
government sponsored remedies that we recommend a community may utilize to af-
fect business decisions and what many view to be a business' fundamental right re-
garding disposition of its assets. Many view a business' right to deploy its assets
where and when it wants to, to maximize shareholder profit and without government
supervision, as a fundamental tenet of American business law. Others argue that,
among other things, due to the monolithic size of many American businesses and the
concomitant power they wield, businesses should and must be subject to social values
in addition to maximizing shareholder value, especially when business decisions are
particularly disruptive to an economy or community.
It is not the purpose of this article to explore this related but distinct issue.
Rather, we proceed upon the basis that in some circumstances governments may af-
fect otherwise unilateral business decisions.
For authorities advocating the "unfettered" perspective, see generally M. FRIED-
MAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1982); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Move-
ment, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1291 (1982) (arguing that no evidence exists to support
the claims of corporate regulation advocates); Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its
Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1614 (1981) (discussing history of internal govern-
ance structure of big corporations). For authorities advocating the broader "social
responsibility" perspective, see generally Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Re-
[Vol. 16
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presented that explore and assess the legal and policy feasibil-
ity of using either option as a tool to influence business deci-
sions. Finally, Minnesota law will be examined to determine
the feasibility of the options under current state law.
THE EXPANSIVE MODERN USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is the authority of the government to take
private property for a public use as long as just compensation
is paid to the owner for the taking. I I This authority is available
to the federal 2 as well as each state 13 government by virtue of
their respective constitutions. Historically the "public use"
predicate has been construed narrowly by the judiciary. Typi-
cally, only roads, sewer systems, and other public utility
projects and public institutions such as schools, prisons, and
state hospitals have met the requirement. 14 In recent years,
however, the definition of a public use has expanded so that
practically any acquisition meets the test if it serves a public
forming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 343, 345-46 (1981) (discussing dangers, problems and proposed solutions to
corporate regulation); Stevenson, Corporations and Social Responsibility: In Search of the
Corporate Soul, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (1974) (suggesting some mecha-
nisms that might be used to improve the impact of large corporations on the quality
of life). For a more neutral perspective, see An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1979).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) Oust compensation
means full monetary equivalent of the property); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513, 519 (1883) (proceeding to determine value of property is to be conducted in
some fair and just manner); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (U.S.
government has the right of eminent domain within the states); see also 1 NICHOLS'
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.13[l]-[4] (J. Sackman & P. Rohan 3rd ed. 1989).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment is made applicable to the states as
well through "the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution [which]
throws the protection of the federal courts over an individual whose property is
sought to be taken by a state without compensation." 3 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 8.1[2] (J. Sackman & P. Rohan 3rd ed. 1989).
13. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 10; MINN. CONST.
art. I., § 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. A state's "eminent domain power may be
exercised by the legislature directly or delegated in the public interest to corporate
bodies, including individual enterprises and municipalities." Comment, supra note 7,
at 235 & n.20 (citing IA NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.12 (J. Sackman
& P. Rohan 1979)).
14. See generally Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 73, 19 N.W.2d 394, 406 (1945)
(eminent domain applied to easement taken for highway); State v. Severson, 194
Minn. 644, 648, 261 N.W. 469, 471 (1935) (taking of private property allowed for
many uses including streets, parks, highways, and drainage); Knapp v. State, 125
Minn. 194, 199, 145 N.W. 967, 969 (1914) (taking of right of way for railway).
1990]
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purpose, confers a benefit on the public, 15 or furthers the
state's police powers. 16
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court, in Berman v.
Parker, unanimously held constitutional Washington, D.C.'s
use of eminent domain, pursuant to statutory authority, for the
public use of acquiring commercial property for an urban re-
newal project.' 7 While hardly newsworthy today, the Berman
decision was quite remarkable when announced. The expan-
15. For an in-depth discussion of these modern definitions, see infra the cases
cited at footnotes 17, 21-23, and accompanying text. See also Berger, The Public Use
Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978), which states, in part, that:
The precise meaning of the "public use" requirement has varied over
time and according to the type of taking involved. The conventional state-
ment of the historical case development holds that there are two basic op-
posing views of the meaning of "public use": (1) that the term means
advantage or benefit to the public (the so-called broad view); and (2) that it
means actual use or right to use of the condemned property by the public
(the so-called narrow view). The conventional wisdom goes on to say that
right after the Revolution the broad view dominated the courts; that later
the narrow view came into fashion; and that later still and to date, the
broad-and according to many-the enlightened view has returned to
favor. Actually, the history is somewhat more complicated- Id. at 205.
While the narrow view of public use held considerable sway, especially
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it never completely took over the
field. The two doctrines competed, leaving the commentators in hopeless
confusion as to what the "true rule" (for in those days they believed in such
things) was. And no wonder the difficulty, for each view as applied to partic-
ular cases obviously led to at least what were then regarded as unacceptable
results. Thus the narrow use by the public rule would have allowed con-
demnation for the purpose of erecting a privately owned theater or hotel,
something which no one then (or perhaps even now) would seriously advo-
cate. And the broad public advantage test would have allowed a toy manu-
facturer who provided substantial employment in the vicinity to condemn
land for the construction of a plant, likewise then unthinkable. Id. at 209.
It has been said that the law has finally eliminated the public use re-
quirement as an effective barrier to takings. This is most certainly a vast
overstatement of what the law is. Courts still have a strong desire to act as a
check on takings that they regard as "going too far." On the surface of
things what they regard as "going too far" is answered by reference to one
of the two tests for public use: use by the public or advantage to the public.
But it is submitted that two other issues (sometimes perhaps subcon-
sciously) govern their decisions upon the propriety of a nongovernmental
taking to a much greater degree than is generally realized.
First, does the condemner's need for the taking outweigh the harm to
be visited upon the condemnee? ...
Second, is it necessary that eminent domain be used to carry out the
project or could a purchase in the open market practicably be made? Id. at
223-24.
16. For a somewhat dated (but interesting nonetheless) discussion exploring the
relationship between the state's eminent domain and police powers, see E. FREUND,
POLICE POWER § 511 (1904).
17. 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954). The specific statute under review was the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. In reviewing the constitutionality of the emi-
nent domain provisions of this Act, the Court observed that:
[Vol. 16
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sion of the public use definition came as the Court noted that
"[t]he concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive ....
[T]he power of eminent domain is merely the means to the
end."' 8 Notably, the Court also found that the means used to
exercise eminent domain could include utilizing an entity of
private enterprise or the authorization to take private property
for its resale or lease to the same or other parties.' 9 In this
regard, and especially important here, the Court said that:
[T]he means of executing the project are for Congress and
Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has
been established. The public end may be as well or better
served through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of government-or so the Congress
might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the
sole method of promoting the public purposes of commu-
nity redevelopment projects. 2
0
By § 2 of the Act, Congress made a "legislative determination" that
"owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out and
other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to
substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use of buildings in
alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the
seat of the Government by eliminating all such injurious conditions by em-
ploying all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose."
Section 2 goes on to declare that acquisition of property is necessary to
eliminate these housing conditions.
Congress further finds in § 2 that these ends cannot be attained "by the
ordinary operations of private enterprise alone without public participa-
tion"; that "the sound replanning and redevelopment of an obsolescent or
obsolescing portion" of the District "cannot be accomplished unless it be
done in the light of comprehensive and coordinated planning of the whole
of the territory of the District of Columbia and its environs"; and that "the
acquisition and the assembly of real property and the leasing or sale thereof
for redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment plan ... is
hereby declared to be a public use."
Section 4 creates the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
(hereinafter called the Agency), composed of five members, which is
granted power by § 5 (a) to acquire and assemble, by eminent domain and
otherwise, real property for "the redevelopment of blighted territory in the
District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of
blighted factors or causes of blight."
Id. at 28-29.
18. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted). Berman is a case of importance because "re-
development statutes," such as the one at issue there, have been a source of the
eminent domain power that can logically be used to keep a plant in town. For discus-
sions on the application of redevelopment statutes, see infra notes 25-36, 110-14,
170-71, and 174-80 and accompanying text. However, at least one judge has re-
cently argued that these widely-found redevelopment statutes cannot properly form
1990]
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While Berman illustrates the use of eminent domain to bene-
fit society as a whole, other recent decisions approve its use to
benefit narrower interests in the hope that they will eventually
serve the broader, public interest. This concept is important
because it supports using eminent domain to prevent a busi-
ness closing even though it would appear to only benefit em-
ployees. In fact, given the ripple effect of unemployment in
the economy, preventing closings often benefits the entire
public.
With Berman as a base, numerous court decisions have ex-
panded upon the public use concept. Cases illustrating this in-
clude the decisions in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit,2 1 City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,22 and Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff23 In Poletown the court held constitutional
the City of Detroit's proposed use of its eminent domain au-
thority to condemn and remove a city neighborhood and to
relocate its residents in order to accommodate the desire of
General Motors Corporation to build a new assembly plant.24
The eminent domain authority was exercised pursuant to the
Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act,25 a stat-
the legal basis for the types of eminent domain takings advocated here. Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 645, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464
(198 1) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
21. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
22. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
23. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
24. The specifics of this project were enormous. "City officials had to acquire
nearly seventeen hundred pieces of property, relocate more than thirty-five hundred
residents, demolish fifteen hundred residential and commercial structures, and com-
plete the site preparation in less than eighteen months." B. JONES & L. BACHELOR,
THE SUSTAINING HAND 84 (1986). To accomplish this the city would invest over $250
million of public monies. General Motors investment in the project amounted to
$600 million. The project was the "largest urban land-assemblage and clearance
program in United States history." Id. at 74.
25. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 125.1601-36 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). Also
employed in the Poletown eminent domain action was an act passed by the Michigan
Legislature in April, 1980. This act, also commonly known as the "quick take law,"
was used in conjunction with the Economic Development Corporations Act in the
case to ensure the speedy condemnation of property and removal of the property
owners. The quick take law:
allowed municipalities to acquire title to property before reaching agree-
ment with individual owners on a purchase price. The Act responded to
experiences in urban-renewal and other redevelopment projects in which
negotiations over the price of a few parcels of land had delayed and often
sabotaged the implementation of a project. Previously, owners could block
governmental action by obtaining an injunction in circuit court; if the par-
ties could not agree on a purchase price, the court would impose one.
[Vol. 16
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ute similar to that at issue in Berman. The Act declares that:
There exists in this state the continuing need for programs
to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment, and
the legislature finds that it is accordingly necessary to assist
and retain local industrial and commercial enterprises, in-
cluding employee-owned corporations, to strengthen and
revitalize the economy of this state and its municipalities
.... Therefore, the powers granted in this act constitute
the performance of essential public purposes and functions
for this state and its municipalities.
26
With the City of Detroit's stated objective and this statute
before it, the issue for the court was whether the proposed use
of eminent domain was an unconstitutional taking of private
property for private use. The court held it was not.
The court began its analysis of the issue by signaling that
this case was not going to be decided by a rigid application of
the public use or purpose requirement. Rather, an expansive
definition was to be followed, for this was a case of great social
and economic importance for both the City of Detroit and the
State of Michigan. 27 Stating that "[tihis case raises a question
of paramount importance to the future welfare of this state and
its residents," 28 the court rephrased the purely legal issue by
asking:
Court backlogs, up to five years in Wayne County Circuit Court [Detroit],
meant that there were incentives for owners to hold out for large settle-
ments.
The "quick take" law meant that the land around [Poletown] could be
assembled quickly enough to meet General Motors' deadlines. Without it,
Poletown would have survived, and Detroit would not have gained an as-
sembly plant.
B. JONES & L. BACHELOR, supra note 24, at 76-77.
26. MICH. COMP. Laws ANN. § 125.1602.
27. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 620-21,
304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1981). The City argued its case from beginning to end em-
phasizing the great social and economic issues at stake. Specifically,
[t]o justify the need for the project, the city provided information on the
declining job base of the cities of Detroit and Hamtramck and the unem-
ployment rates in those cities, layoffs of city employees, cutbacks in city serv-
ices, lowering of ratings of city bonds, reductions in the tax base of both
cities, and increases in the number of residents receiving welfare. Construc-
tion of the GM plant . . . was essential "to address the city's emergency
financial condition and the economic state of emergency that has been de-
clared by the Governor of Michigan."
B. JONES & L. BACHELOR, supra note 24, at 85. Additional analysis of the issues
presented in this case can be found in Comment, Corporate Prerogative, "Public Use" and
a People's Plight: Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 1982 DET. C.L.
REV. 907, 907-29.
28. 410 Mich. at 629, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
1990]
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Can a municipality use the power of eminent domain
granted to it by the Economic Development Corporations
Act, to condemn property for transfer to a private corpora-
tion to build a plant to promote industry and commerce,
thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the
municipality and state?
29
The court found that what constitutes a public use varies
with changing societal conditions and the touchstone of public
use analysis is whether there is a public right to the benefits of
the use.30 Having concluded that in Michigan the approach to
satisfying the public use requirement is flexible and changes
with society's changing needs, the court then addressed the
plaintiffs' claims.
The plaintiffs claimed that using the power of eminent do-
main to condemn one person's private property to convey it to
another private person in order to bolster the economy was
unconstitutional. The Neighborhood Council argued that
General Motors was a private person and was primary benefici-
ary of the condemnation. Thus, the use of eminent domain in
this instance represented a conveyance of one's private prop-
erty to another and that any public benefit was incidental. 3'
On the other hand, the City argued that the controlling pub-
lic purpose in taking the land was to create a manufacturing
facility which would ultimately alleviate and prevent conditions
of unemployment and fiscal distress in the area. Thus, the
property being conveyed to and ultimately used by a private
manufacturer did not defeat this predominant public purpose.
The court stated that there was no dispute regarding condem-
nation law. If the condemnation is for a public purpose, it is
permitted and, if for a private use, it is forbidden.3 2 The diffi-
culty in Poletown was not that the condemnation was for the
general good of the community, but rather that the direct and
immediate beneficiary was a private corporation.
Over vigorous and thoughtful dissents, the majority of the
court was persuaded by the City's arguments. After noting
that "[t]he legislature has determined that governmental ac-
tion of the type contemplated here meets a public need and
serves an essential public purpose," the court stated that its
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id.
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role after such a determination was limited.33 Specifically, a
court's determination of what constitutes a public purpose is
subject to adherence to legislative intent. If the legislature
precisely states what a public purpose is, then the courts may
only make a determination when the legislative power is
abused.3 4 Furthermore, courts are to use heightened scrutiny
in cases where the condemnation power is exercised in a way
that benefits specific and identifiable private interests. In par-
ticular, the "public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal
but must be clear and significant if it is to be within the legiti-
mate purpose as stated by the Legislature."35
Certainly the condemnation in Poletown benefits private in-
terests. But, the court also found several "clear and signifi-
cant" public benefits, including the alleviation of severe
economic conditions in both the city and state, the revitaliza-
tion of local industries through new industrial development,
and the general economic boost that the project would pro-
vide. 36 These benefits were sufficient to satisfy the court that:
such a project was an intended and a legitimate object of
33. Id. at 632, 304 N.W.2d at 458. These public needs and purposes were speci-
fied in the Act and are reprinted at supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
35. Id. at 635, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60.
36. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459. These "public benefit" issues were thor-
oughly developed at the trial court level in large part through the testimony of De-
troit Mayor Coleman Young.
Young's testimony emphasized the serious fiscal problems being faced by
the city, with repeated references to the deterioration of its economic base,
the loss ofjobs, the increasing unemployment, budget deficits, the layoffs of
city employees, and cutbacks in city services. The city's attorney, Jason
Honigman, explored these topics at length with the mayor, securing abun-
dant testimony on the relationship between the topics and the public inter-
est and public purpose that provide the legal basis for land acquisition
under [the Economic Development Corporation Act].
B. JONES & L. BACHELOR, supra note 24, at 119.
Of particular importance for this paper's purposes, it should be noted that in the
trial court the City argued that one of the primary public benefits to be derived from
the proposed use of eminent domain was the retention (as opposed to the creation) of
employment opportunities. If the proposed use were sanctioned, and the new plant
built, jobs in two other already existing nearby GM plants would be saved because
these plants would supply parts to the new plant. (The new plant was to replace one
being closed so the supply would remain steady.) If the proposed use were not per-
.mitted the plant would be located elsewhere and suppliers close to the new location
would replace those in the Detroit area. The City argued these facts to the trial court
claiming the retention of employment opportunities constituted a legally recognized
public purpose. The trial court held in the City's favor on all issues presented.
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, No. 80-039-426 CZ (Wayne
County Circuit Court, Dec. 8, 1980).
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the Legislature when it allowed municipalities to exercise
condemnation powers even though a private party will also,
ultimately, receive a benefit as an incident thereto.
The power of eminent domain is to be used in this in-
stance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes
of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic
base of the community. The benefit to a private interest is
merely incidental.
3 7
To summarize, the Poletown court held: 1) that the project
would serve the public purposes enumerated by the Michigan
Economic Development Corporations Act, and 2) that these
purposes fell within the scope of the proper exercise of emi-
nent domain under the state constitution.
What is most notable about the Poletown decision is its ex-
pansive definition of what could constitute a public use or pur-
pose. In the past, the public use requirement could be met
only by the construction of such "traditional" public necessi-
ties as roads, sewer systems, penal institutions and hospitals.
Now, general economic prosperity supplements the traditional
purposes and creates a previously unknown flexibility in the
use of eminent domain. This flexibility greatly troubled the
Poletown dissenters, who concluded that "the proposed con-
demnation clearly exceeds the government's authority to take
private property" 38 and expressed concern that the court's rul-
ing could set a precedent for "the most outrageous confisca-
tion of private property for the benefit of other private interest
without redress." 39 As the dissenters had feared, the Poletown
case now clearly stands for the proposition that the power of
eminent domain can be used to both preserve and to create
jobs.
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders40 is another recent example
37. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
38. Id. at 636, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 639, 304 N.W.2d at 462 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
40. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982). An outline of the
subsequent procedural history of the case is as follows. The Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Subsequently, the court
of appeals granted a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to hold a
hearing on an application for reinstatement of an earlier issued preliminary injunc-
tion against the transfer of the franchise. 136 Cal. App. 3d 565, 186 Cal. Rptr. 326
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Following the reinstatement and modification of the injunction
against the transfer, the trial court entered ajudgment against the City. The court of
appeals then issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate the instruc-
tion and to proceed to determine the remaining objections to the eminent domain
[Vol. 16
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of the use of eminent domain to accomplish broadly drawn so-
cial, economic, and, in this case particularly, cultural purposes,
all of which are deemed "public purposes." In Oakland Raiders
the City of Oakland attempted to use its eminent domain
power to seize all the real and personal business assets of the
Raiders' football franchise. In effect, eminent domain was be-
ing used to take over a private business in order to serve the
greater cultural and economic needs of the general public.
In Oakland Raiders, the coliseum that the team played in was
leased by the team owners from a public, non-profit city-
county corporation. Upon failure to reach a settlement on an
option to renew the lease, the team announced its intention to
remove itself to Los Angeles. To prevent this, the City of Oak-
land commenced an eminent domain action to acquire all the
property rights associated with the team, including players'
contracts, team equipment, and television and radio contracts.
The franchise owner argued against the City's action on three
grounds: 1) that the law of eminent domain did not permit the
taking of intangible property not associated with realty (here,
the team's network of intangible contractual rights), 2) that the
City's contemplated taking could not, as a matter of law, be for
any public use within the City's authority, and 3) that, even if it
is proper for the City to own a sports franchise, it could not
condemn an established team.
4'
In reversing the grant of a motion for summary judgment in
the team's favor, the California Supreme Court rejected all of
the team's arguments. Responding to the team's first argu-
ment, the court initially noted that "[n]o constitutional restric-
tion, federal or state, purports to limit the nature of the
property that may be taken by eminent domain." 42 Similarly,
the court noted that under the applicable California eminent
domain statute, there were no apparent restrictions on the
action that had not been ruled on previously. 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 197 Cal. Rptr.
729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). In this remand, the court held that the City's action was
invalid under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. 174 Cal. App. 3d
414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See also Note, The Commerce Clause Limi-
tation on the Power to Condemn a Relocating Business, 96 YALE LJ. 1343 (1987). A petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed on this decision but was subse-
quently denied. 478 U.S. 1007 (1986). Except for one final appeal based on attor-
neys fees awarded earlier, the denial of the writ for certiorari was effectively the end
of the case.
41. Oakland Raiders at 64, 646 P.2d at 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
42. Id. at 64, 646 P.2d at 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
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"type" of property that may properly be taken by eminent do-
main. 43 The court interpreted the statute to allow a broad def-
inition of property, which included " 'any type of right, title or
interest in property that may be required for public use.' "44
Citing respected treatise writers and commentators as authori-
tative, the court recognized that the power of eminent domain
could be used to acquire " '[i]ntangible property, such as
choses in action, patent rights, franchises, charters or any
other form of contract' "45 and "'property of every kind and
character, whether real or personal, or tangible or intangible
... "46 Based upon these authorities the court concluded
"that our eminent domain law authorizes the taking of intangi-
ble property." 47 Thus, the team's first argument, that eminent
domain law did not permit the taking of its intangible personal
property, was soundly refuted by the court.
Turning next to the team's improper public use argument,
the court began its analysis of this issue by defining the mod-
em parameters of the public use requirement. A public use is:
"a use which concerns the whole community or promotes
the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of
government." On the other hand, "[ilt is not essential that
the entire community, or even any considerable portion
thereof, shall directly enjoy or participate in an improve-
ment in order to constitute a public use."'48
The court then noted and discussed the wealth of authority49
holding generally that the acquisition and provision of recrea-
tional facilities and services by a municipality are indeed
proper public uses or purposes. Finally, the court posed the
rhetorical question: "[i]s the obvious difference between man-
43. Id. at 65, 646 P.2d at 838, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
44. Id. at 65, 646 P.2d at 838-39, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 67, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (citing 1 NICHoLs ON EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 2.1[2], at 2-8 to 2-9 (3d ed. 1980)).
46. Id. (citing 26 Am. JUR. 2D, Eminent Domain, § 73, at 733) (footnotes
omitted).
47. Id. at 68, 646 P.2d at 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
48. Id. at 69, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 70-71, 646 P.2d at 841-42, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80. (citing, for exam-
ple, City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 434, 333 P.2d 745, 751
(1959); County of Alameda v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 80, 84, 38
Cal. Rptr. 474, 478 (1964); Egan v. City and County of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576,
582, 133 P. 294, 296 (1913); New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119
N.J. Super. 457, 555, 558, 292 A.2d 580, 635-36, 641 (1971); Martin v. Philadelphia,
420 Pa. 14, 17, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (1966)).
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aging and owning the facility in which the game is played, and
managing and owning the team which plays in the facility, le-
gally substantial?" 50 The court answered itself by stating that,
at least up to that particular moment in time, the team had not
presented any valid legal basis for concluding there is a sub-
stantial difference. 5' The court closed this phase of the case by
concluding that "the acquisition and, indeed, operation of a
sports franchise may be an appropriate municipal function.'52
Turning finally to the team's last argument that the City
could not condemn an established team, the court simply
noted that "[w]hile some statutes do explicitly prohibit the ac-
quisition of an ongoing enterprise, there is no such provision
in present law which would preclude the taking contemplated
by [the] City."5 3 It was pointed out that the California Legisla-
ture clearly knew how t6 prohibit such acquisitions and would
have had it so desired. The Legislature thus recognizes the
power of a municipality to acquire an existing business
through eminent domain unless expressly forbidden. In fact, it
was pointed out that prior acquisitions of operating businesses
had received court approval. 54
The court then summarized its opinion by stating that
"[u]nder the present statutory scheme, the courts have no au-
thority to choose those items of property which they deem ap-
propriate for condemnation." 55  Since the California
Legislature clearly stated that any property may be acquired by
eminent domain, the courts would be making new law, and not
simply interpreting law, if they decided whether this particular
piece of property can be condemned.
The goal sought to be served by the use of eminent domain
in the Oakland Raiders case is indistinguishable from the goal
that would be served by using that power to prevent a plant
shutdown. Furthermore, the taking of an on-going business
enterprise, in the form of a football franchise, is indistinguish-
able from taking a manufacturing plant as long as the same
50. Oakland Raiders at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
53. Id. at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
54. Id. (citing Citizen's Utilities Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 59
Cal. 2d 805, 818, 382 P.2d 356, 365, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316, 323 (1963)). For similar uses
of the eminent domain power, see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
55. Oakland Raiders at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
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public interests are served. 56 Finally, it is more appropriate
that maintaining a community's economic and social fabric
recieve a higher priority than a recreational public purpose.
Another case that exemplifies and solidifies recent state
court expansion of the public use doctrine is Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.57 In Midkiff the issues revolved around the
constitutionality of the Land Reform Act5" enacted by the Ha-
waii Legislature in 1967. The purpose of the Act was to elimi-
nate the perceived social and economic evils inherent in the
56. Chief Justice Bird, in her Oakland Raiders dissent, was very disturbed about
the proposed use of eminent domain and would presumably also be about the use we
advocate here. Bird stated:
The power of eminent domain claimed by the City in this case is not
only novel but virtually without limit. This is troubling because the poten-
tial for abuse of such a great power is boundless. Although I am forced by
the current state of the law to agree with the result reached by the majority,
I have not signed their opinion because it endorses this unprecedented ap-
plication of eminent domain law without even pausing to consider the ulti-
mate consequences of their expansive decision. It should be noted that
research both by the parties and by this court has failed to disclose a single
case in which the legal propositions relied on here have been combined to
reach a result such as that adopted by the majority.
There are two particularly disturbing questions in this case. First, does
a city have the power to condemn a viable, ongoing business and sell it to
another private party merely because the original owner has announced his
intention to move his business to another city? For example, if a rock con-
cert impresario, after some years of producing concerts in a municipal sta-
dium, decides to move his productions to another city, may the city
condemn his business, including his contracts with the rock stars, in order to
keep the concerts at the stadium? If a small business that rents a storefront
on land originally taken by the city for a redevelopment project decides to
move to another city in order to expand, may the city take the business and
force it to stay at its original location? May a city condemn any business that
decides to seek greener pastures elsewhere under the unlimited interpreta-
tion of eminent domain law that the majority appear to approve?
Second, even if a city were legally able to do so, is it proper for a munic-
ipality to drastically invade personal property rights to further the policy
interest asserted here?
It strikes me as dangerous and heavy-handed for the government to
take over a business, including all of its tangible assets, for the sole purpose
of preventing its relocation. The decisional law appears to be silent as to
this particular question. It appears that the courts have not yet been con-
fronted with a situation such as that presented by this case. However, a
review of the pertinent case law demonstrates that decisions as to the proper
scope of the power of eminent domain generally have been considered leg-
islative, rather than judicial, in nature. Therefore, in the absence of a legis-
lative bar to the use of eminent domain in this manner, there appears to be
no ground for judicial intervention.
Oakland Raiders at 76-78, 646 P.2d at 845-46, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
57. 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984).
58. HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 516 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
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large feudal land estates existing since the time of the early
high chiefs of the Hawaiian Islands. To achieve this purpose,
the Act created the Hawaii Housing Authority (Authority). By
using a land condemnation scheme, the Authority could take
title to the real property from the lessors, condemn it, compen-
sate the lessors for the taking, and then sell the property to the
lessees inhabiting the land at the time it was condemned. The
process was instituted only after the Authority determined that
the acquisition of the tract would effectuate the public pur-
poses of the Act.
In Midkif, the Authority determined that taking the land
held by the lessors would effectuate the Act's purposes and di-
rected the lessors to negotiate the sale of the land to its les-
sees. When these negotiations failed, the Authority ordered
the lessors to submit to compulsory arbitration as required by
the Act. Rather than comply with the order, the lessors filed
suit in federal district court asking that the Act be declared un-
constitutional. The district court held the compulsory -arbitra-
tion and compensation formulas of the Act unconstitutional
but found the remainder of the Act constitutional under the
Fifth Amendment's public use requirement. 59 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Act violated
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 6
0
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
court of appeals. 6' The Court noted the appeals court's con-
cern that "[s]ince Hawaiian lessees retain possession of the
property for private use throughout the condemnation pro-
cess, . . . the Act exacted takings for private use." 62 In re-
sponse to this concern, the Court stated that:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent
domain is transferred in the first instance to private benefi-
ciaries does not condemn that taking as having only a pri-
vate purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for
the general public. "It is not essential that the entire com-
munity, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly en-
59. Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 70 (1979), rev'd, sub. nom. Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
60. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (1983), rev'd, sub. nom. Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
61. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
62. Id. at 243.
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joy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to
constitute a public use." "[W]hat in its immediate aspect
[is] only a private transaction may . be raised by its class
or character to a public affair."163
The Midkiff ruling, as well as the rulings in Oakland Raiders and
Poletown, endorses the use of eminent domain as a tool to re-
distribute private resources within society to accomplish widely
drawn public purposes. The cases exemplify the expansive in-
terpretation now given the public use requirement and signal
the appropriateness of using eminent domain to prevent plant
closings. Such a use is clearly within the spirit, if not the letter,
of these cases. These cases have led legal commentators 64 and
community activists65 to concluded that eminent domain could
be used by municipalities as a tool, bargaining chip, or strategy
to prevent a plant closing. Against this eminent domain case
law backdrop, we turn then to the first two of the four prom-
ised case studies.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND PLANT CLOSINGS
A. The Steel Valley Authority
The Steel Valley Authority (SVA) is a quasi-public agency
which represents various economic development interests of
ten communities in and around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The
SVA was organized in response to the general erosion, during
the late 1970's and early 1980's, of the manufacturing base in
the tri-state region of eastern Ohio, western Pennsylvania and
northern West Virginia.66 Threatened by the erosion of the
63. Id. at 243-44 (citation omitted).
64. See, e.g., Comment, Eminent Domain as a Tool to Set Up Employee-Owned Businesses
in the Face of Shutdowns, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 271, 286 (1986) (noting that eminent domain
may be used by municipalities to promote employee-owned business arrangements);
Comment, supra note 1, at 129 (points out the pros and cons of exercising eminent
domain to avoid plant shutdowns, including policy considerations that encourage
and discourage municipalities' exercise of eminent domain); Comment, supra note 7,
at 248 (recent court decisions have apparently dissolved the public use requirement
of municipalities' exercise of eminent domain). But see, Note, The Commerce Clause Lim-
itation on the Power to Condemn a Relocating Business, 96 YALE L.J. 1343 (1987) (arguing
that these types of uses of eminent domain would violate the Commerce Clause).
65. Local community action groups that have pressed eminent domain argu-
ments in their efforts to prevent plant closures include The Plant Closure Project
(433 Jefferson St., Oakland, CA 94607) and The Seattle Work Center (an organiza-
tion discussed by Lewiston & Wise, Locked Out By Lockheed, DOLLARS AND SENSE, Dec.
1987, at 17).
66. See Harrison, When Workers Become Entrepreneurs, TECHNOLOGY REV., July 1989
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manufacturing base of this region, local union, church, and
grass roots political activists banded together in 1979 to form
the Tri-State Conference on Steel (Tri-State). Tri-State's goal
was to save the steel mills of the area and to keep jobs in local
communities. In 1984, when the United States Steel Corpora-
tion announced its plans to close its Duquesne, Pennsylvania
blast furnaces, Tri-State called for the formation of the SVA to
combat the closure. When the ten municipalities banded to-
gether, the SVA was born.
The concept of an SVA was first proposed at a Tri-State
meeting held late in 1983. Out of this meeting came a pub-
lished proposal entitled Rebuild Steel.67 The proposal ambi-
tiously called for the establishment of a "Tennessee Valley
Authority for Steel" program which would seek a workable and
socially responsible plan to save the domestic steel industry.
This would be accomplished by the creation of the SVA which
would acquire abandoned, or soon to be abandoned, steel
mills in the area. The major difference between the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) and the SVA would be that the latter
would be neither federally funded or controlled. In fact, the
aim of the SVA was local community control.
68
To accomplish these goals Tri-State stated that "[t]he power
of 'eminent domain', inherent in the soverign [sic] State of
Pennsylvania, must, therefore, be delegated to the 'Steel Valley
Authority.' -69 Both SVA's incorporation 70 and its use of the
eminent domain power rested on the Pennsylvania Municipal-
ity Authorities Act.7 1 This Act defines the power of any au-
thority incorporated under it, including the SVA, to engage in
economic development. The parameters of the Act are very
broad. It permits an authority to undertake various kinds of
at 19. In this article Harrison states that -[b]etween 1977 and 1982, shrinking steel
firms laid off about 100,000 workers in the tri-state region .... Local officials esti-
mate that there are still 25,000 to 30,000 former industrial workers out of work in the
Mon Valley alone." Id.
67. Tri-State Conference on Steel, A Summary of a Plan to Reconstruct Pitts-
burg's Steel Industry (1984) (main author of summary is C. McCollester, assisted by
members of various unions).
68. Id. at 8-9.
69. Id. at 9.
70. "Articles of incorporation for the SVA were filed with the Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on November 15, 1985; a certificate of incorporation
was issued on January 31, 1986." Hornack & Lynd, The Steel Valley Authority, 15
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 113, 116 n.16 (1986-87).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 301-22 (Purdon 1974 & 1989).
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projects, including the acquisition, construction, improvement,
maintenance, and operation of certain structures and facili-
ties. 72 The purposes of these projects include efforts to retain
or develop existing industries and the development of new in-
dustries. 73 Furthermore, the delegated powers may be exer-
cised to acquire and to hold almost any form of property.
74
An authority may sell, lease, transfer, or dispose of all or part
of a project to a third party, 75 or it may operate the project
itself.76 The Act also grants authorities power "[t]o contract
with any municipality, corporation, or any public Authority of
[Pennsylvania] or any adjoining state, on such terms as the said
Authority shall deem proper, for the construction and opera-
tion of any project which is partly in [Pennsylvania] and partly
in an adjoining state." 7
7
Based upon the clear authority and mandate of the Munici-
pality Authorities Act, the SVA has formulated a basic opera-
tional outline.
At present, the SVA does not contemplate operating in-
dustrial development projects in the sense of managing the
facilities. Instead, the SVA intends to coordinate industrial
development managed by third parties. This coordination
may be carried out in two ways. First, the SVA could "retain -
or develop existing industries" by acting as a broker be-
tween owners of a presently operating facility and a third
party. Second, the SVA could acquire abandoned facilities
for the "development of new industries" and then sell or
lease them to other operators. Under the first option, when
a party is interested in acquiring an existing industrial facil-
ity whose present owner is not willing to sell, the SVA could
condemn the property and then transfer it to the buyer.
The SVA would thus "force" a sale of the structure or facil-
ity at fair market value as determined in an eminent domain
proceeding.
78
Despite the obvious attraction and utility of using a munici-
72. § 302(j).
73. § 306(A)(a)(17) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).




78. Hornack & Lynd, supra note 70, at 118-19 (1986-87) (footnotes omitted). In
support of their position, the authors cited PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306(A)(a)(17)
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pal corporation's powers of eminent domain to prevent plant
closings, inherent in the use of these powers is the problem of
providing just compensation for the taking. The traditional
measurement of just compensation is the fair market value of
the property taken, with fair market value defined as what a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller.79 As envisioned by
Tri-State, the money necessary to provide the required com-
pensation would come either through the Act's bonding au-
thority provision, 80 or from a variety of other sources,
including "union pension fund investment infederally guaranteed
bonds; federal and state loan guarantees; direct investment by
local, State and Federal Government; tax exempt municipal
and industrial bonds; tax credits; worker contributions; and
guaranteed purchase agreements for the plate and structural
steel to be used in infrastructure rebuilding." 8'
If the acquisition of a plant appears difficult due to the in-
ability to raise an adequate amount of money for compensa-
tion, some commentators have suggested an alternative
valuation to replace the fair market value test.
Commentators on international law have suggested that just
compensation is a social as well as a technical issue. Ac-
cording to this view, the fair value of a facility may be af-
fected by how that facility has been operated. Some have
suggested that the following factors should be considered in
determining the amount of compensation: the circum-
stances of the original investment (for instance, whether the
company secured its initial position through force or fraud);
whether the company has extracted substantial profits from
the community; whether a facility's operations have caused
environmental damage over a period of years; and whether
the taking is pursuant to a broad program of economic and
social reform. These factors can dramatically affect the
amount of compensation required in an eminent domain
proceeding. 82
Even with the obvious financial problems the SVA faces in
paying just compensation, the recent use of eminent domain
power for this purpose is substantial. As noted above, 83 the
79. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306(B)(i) (Purdon 1974).
81. Tri-State Conference on Steel, supra note 67, at 10.
82. Hornack & Lynd, supra note 70, at 122-23 (footnotes omitted).
83. See supra Section II of the text.
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recently expanded definition of public use resulting from the
Berman, Poletown, Oakland Raiders, and Midkiff cases supports the
conclusion that local, quasi-governmental entities can constitu-
tionally exercise granted eminent domain powers for the pub-
lic use purpose of broadly or discretely enhancing the local
economy. Furthermore, other quasi-governmental agencies
established pursuant to the Pennsylvania Municipality Authori-
ties Act have had their exercises of eminent domain power up-
held under Pennsylvania law.8 4
Despite its apparent legal authority to use eminent domain,
the SVA has not actually used this power to acquire property.
This is due in large part to the financial constraints of exercis-
ing the power. Nevertheless, even the threat of using eminent
domain can be an effective tool in keeping a plant where it is
currently located.8 5
For example, in the fall of 1982, the Nabisco Brands Food
Company announced its intention to close a plant in Pitts-
burgh that employed 650 people. A coalition of various com-
munity groups, including political forces, threatened the use of
eminent domain should the company attempt to close the
plant. Less than a month after the threat was initially voiced,
the company announced that the plant would remain open.8 6
B. Morse Cutting Tool
The widely publicized Morse Cutting Tool Company
(Morse) 7 case provides another example of the effectiveness
of threatening to exercise eminent domain, although the
Morse situation represents a more formalized threat than that
voiced in the Nabisco case. The threat was voiced by the
84. See, e.g., In re Condemnation of 49.0768 Acres, 427 Pa. 1, 4, 233 A.2d 237,
239 (1967) (municipal corporation power of eminent domain is not limited where
land being condemned for second airport would not serve same purpose as first air-
port); Truitt v. Borough of Ambridge Water Authority, 389 Pa. 429, 431, 133 A.2d
797, 798 (1957) (water authority's power includes right to acquire land presently
needed and land possibly needed for future use).
85. Hornack & Lynd, supra note 70, at 123. The authors noted that:
[t]hreatening to take a facility may avoid the problem of determining and
paying just compensation, while securing the desired result of keeping busi-
ness in the community. In order for this tactic to work in the long run, the
public authority must at least appear to have the ability and the intent to
take the property.
Id.
86. Id. at 123-24 & nn.71-74.
87. Several authors also refer to the Cutting Tool plant as Morse Cutting Tools.
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Mayor of New Bedford on June 2, 1984, as a final attempt by a
frustrated city and its citizens to keep a large employer in the
community. Less than three months later the company was in
the hands of a new owner who promised to keep it in New Bed-
ford.88 While New Bedford did not actually have to exercise its
eminent domain power, the Morse case illustrates how the
threatened exercise of the power may work as an effective tool
of industrial policy to fight plant closings.
As "[t]he first plant of its kind in the United States, Morse
Cutting Tool was organized in 1864 as a family firm in New
Bedford. Its founder, Stephen Morse, invented the modern-
day twist drill, rendering obsolete the old straight drill ....89
In 1941, while the company was still family-owned, it was un-
ionized by the United States Electrical Workers Union. 9° In its
almost fifty year involvement at Morse, the union has gone on
strike only twice, once in 1976, and again in 1982. 9 1 The
events that unfolded shortly after the second strike prompted
the mayor's eventual threat to take over the company through
eminent domain.
The problems began at Morse in 1981, thirteen years after
Gulf + Western (G + W) purchased the plant.92 At G + W's
annual meeting, Board Chairman Charles Bluhdorn proposed
a" 'six-month freeze on all wages at G + W and a reduction of
bonuses.' "93 The proposal came despite record earnings for
G + W. The following January, corporate management re-
quested further concessions from the New Bedford local union
to prevent a plant move to Super Tool in Michigan. Several
days later G + W management presented new terms to the
union's officials demanding substantial wage and benefit
concessions.94
Despite a 415 to 7 union membership vote in favor of a
88. Hornack & Lynd, supra note 70, at 124.
89. B. DOHERTY, THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE MORSE CUTrrNG TOOL 2 (1986) (pub-
lished by the Arnold M. Dubin Labor Education Center, Southeastern Massachusetts
University).
90. Swinney, UE Local 277's Strike at Morse Cutting Tool, 1 LABOR RESEARCH REV.,
Fall 1982, at 4, 5.
91. Id.
92. B. DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 2. The Morse family sold the plant in 1946.
The plant was then owned by only two successive owners until G + W purchased the
plant in 1968.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Swinney, supra note 90, at 5-6.
1990]
23
Schultz: The Use of Eminent Domain and Contractually Implied Property Righ
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
strike, the "[union] leaders did not want to wage a long defen-
sive strike." 95 Instead, they took the offensive, making G +
W's disinvestment at Morse the real issue rather than wage
concessions.9 6
To substantiate the disinvestment theory, the union hired a
private consultant to investigate G + W's policies. The con-
sultant discovered that G + W was implementing a policy of
"systematic corporate disinvestment." Profits from Morse
were being transferred to other G + W operations. Between
1977 and 1982, capital investment in the Morse plant was less
than $800,000, far below the industry standard.97
Armed with data indicating that the real source of Morse's
problems was its disinvestment policy, and not high wages and
low productivity, the union went on strike. The strike lasted
thirteen weeks and resulted in a slight union victory: wages
were nominally increased. Several days into the strike the New
Bedford City Council raised its first "trial balloon" on the use
of eminent domain when it resolved "[t]hat we do everything
possible within the jurisdiction of the City Council to insure
Morse Cutting Tools will survive in New Bedford under the
present or alternate ownership." 98
After the strike ended, everyone in the community thought
that the fight to save Morse had been won. In fact, the struggle
had only begun. After the strike only 200 of the 500 pre-strike
Morse employees were called back to work. Then, exactly one
year after the strike ended, G + W announced plans to elimi-
nate much of its manufacturing operations. The following
month, G + W announced its plans to sell Morse. 99 By the
spring of 1984 the union, with help from the State of Massa-
95. Id. at 6-7.
96. B. DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 7. In fact, "[b]ecause management and labor
disagreed over the basic issues underlying their dispute, the strike at Morse received
extensive media coverage, locally, regionally and nationally." Id. Doherty cites, for
example, an article that appeared in the Providence Journal Bulletin on June 27,
1982, which stated that " '[i]f the UE can keep the debate on this level it may have
some powerful allies. The issue will not be a narrow one of labor versus manage-
ment, but the much broader one of community versus conglomerate.'" Id.
97. Swinney, supra note 90, at 7. Compared with the $800,000 invested in the
New Bedford operation, "[ffrom 1978 to 1982 (four years), $1.5 million was invested
in Union Twist Drill in Athol, and from 1979 to 1982 (three years), more than $5
million was invested in new equipment at Greenfield Tap and Die-two of Morse's
chief competitors, also located in Massachusetts." B. DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 6.
98. Swinney, supra note 90, at 12 (City of New Bedford resolution).
99. B. DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 13.
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chusetts and Governor Dukakis, was actively seeking a buyer
for Morse. 100
On June 4, 1984, the City of New Bedford formally became
involved. In a major news conference and address to the City
Council, the mayor announced the City's plan to seize Morse
through its eminent domain power and sell the plant to a buyer
who would commit to keeping the plant in New Bedford and to
modernizing it.101 Noting first the long relationship between
the City and the company, the mayor stated that " '[i]ts a two
way street. We have been interwoven with private business for
quite some time. We've got a company here that plans to
abandon the city. It is not our intent to run (Morse), we are
looking to save it and the jobs in the community.' "102
Two months after the June 4 news conference, G + W
backed down and sold Morse to a buyer who would agree to
the two conditions set by the City.'
0 3
Even if a buyer had not been found for the company, the
City was convinced of its authority to proceed with its
threatened use of eminent domain. The City relied in this re-
gard upon the conclusions drawn in a report prepared for the
union local by the Institute for Public Representation (IPR) of
Washington, D.C. 10 4 The union asked IPR to produce a mem-
orandum examining the legal justification for the City of New
Bedford to take over the Morse plant. 0 5 The memorandum
that was prepared concluded that "the [C]ity of New Bedford
can use its eminent domain powers to condemn the Morse
Cutting Tools plant."' 1 6 Since the City's goals in acquiring the
plant were to prevent unemployment, preserve jobs, and main-
tain a healthy local economy (all proper public purposes under
100. Id. at 15.
101. Id. at 17.
102. Id. at 14. For a similar "relationship" argument, see supra notes 131-32 and
accompanying text.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. The IPR is a public interest firm and law school clinical education pro-
gram which was founded by Georgetown University Law Center and the Ford Foun-
dation in 1971. The IPR provides legal services to groups and individuals who are
unable to obtain effective legal representation on matters which have a significant
impact on issues of broad public importance.
105. Id.
106. Memorandum by the Institute for Public Representation, Power of New Bed-
ford, Massachusetts, to Acquire the Morse Cutting Tools Plant Through Eminent
Domain 4 (May 18, 1984) (prepared by A. Buchsbaum, A. Haft & D. Parker) [herein-
after, New Bedford Memorandum].
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the recent public use definitions 0 7), the IPR reasoned that,
based upon at least two authorities, such a taking would be
permissible. 0 8 Those sources of authority were the Home
Rule Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution' 0 9 and the
Massachusetts Economic Development and Industrial Corpo-
rations Act (Act)."l0
Pursuant to the latter Act, a municipality may organize an
economic development and industrial corporation"' for the
general purpose of enhancing local economic development
and the well being of communities." l2 To accomplish these
goals the Act establishes the corporation's power to acquire
property through eminent domain.' 13 Based upon their analy-
sis of these sections, relevant case law and other authority, the
IPR concluded that the City had the authority to acquire the
real property elements of the Morse plant.' '
4
107. See generally supra Section II of the text.
108. New Bedford Memorandum, supra note 106, at 4.
109. MASS. CONST. Amend. Art. II.
110. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 121C (1986 & Supp. 1989).
111. Id. at § 3.
112. Id. at § 2.
113. Id. at § 5(1). The Act states that power to acquire property is granted for the:
purpose of eliminating decadent, substandard, or blighted open conditions
therein, preventing recurrence of such conditions in the area, the removal of
structures and improvements of sites for manufacturing and industrial uses,
the disposition of the property for redevelopment incidental to the forego-
ing, the exercise of powers by the corporation and any assistance which may
be given by the municipality, or any other public body in connection there-
with are public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended
and the power of eminent domain exercised; and that the acquisition, plan-
ning, clearance, development, rehabilitation or rebuilding of such decadent
and blighted open areas for industrial or manufacturing purposes, are pub-
lic uses and benefits for which private property may be acquired by eminent
domain or regulated by wholesome and reasonable orders, laws and direc-
tions and for which public funds may be expended for the good and welfare
of the municipality and of this commonwealth.
Id. at § 2.
114. New Bedford Memorandum, supra note 106, at 15. The memorandum cites,
for example, Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 904, 907, 369
N.E.2d 447, 449 (1977) ("Reducing unemployment and stimulating the economy are
public purposes ...."); Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 368
Mass. 880, 885, 335 N.E.2d 362, 365 (1975) (' The reduction of unemployment and
alleviation of economic distress,' as well as the '[s]timulation of investment and job
opportunity... are proper public purposes' ") (citations omitted); Machado v. Board
of Public Works, 321 Mass. 101, 103, 71 N.E.2d 886, 887-88 (1947) ("land can be
taken by eminent domain only for public purpose."); Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Hol-
yoke Housing Auth., 304 Mass. 288, 292, 23 N.E.2d 665, 667-68 (1939) (the court
lists several factors which distinguish a public purpose from a private use). New Bed-
ford Memorandum, supra note 106, at 10-11.
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The second source of authority for New Bedford to proceed
was the Home Rule Amendment. This amendment grants cit-
ies and towns powers not denied them by express or clearly
implied state legislation or by state constitutional provi-
sions.1 5 Of particular importance in the Morse case is the
Amendment's apparent authorization of ordinances that allow
condemnation of personal and intangible property. 16
Despite this apparent authority to do so, New Bedford was
not forced to test the correctness of the IPR's eminent domain
conclusions because the Morse plant was purchased by a pri-
vate investor who promised to keep it in town. However, some
commentators believe that New Bedford's threatened use of
eminent domain helped push G + W into a position where it
was more amenable to an offer from this investor. 1 7 The
Morse case shows that, although as yet not entirely tested and
upheld in a court of law, this use of eminent domain has
enough credibility to alter some corporations' behavior. Until
the time comes when these theories are fully tested, at least
this threat is an effective tool in influencing the corporate deci-
sion-making process.
Finally, the most important limitation on this use of eminent
domain is the requirement that the company be paid for what
is taken. Because of this limitation, eminent domain should
not be viewed as either the sole or most important economic
development tool in a community's arsenal. It is only one tool
and, as with plant closing laws, it is primarily, although not ex-
clusively, a defensive measure. This tool should not be used in
every case of an attempted shut down. Eminent domain is an
important policy choice that must be made on a case by case
basis.
For example, there may be many cases where it is simply not
financially feasible to keep a company in a community. Some-
times a plant is closed because of changes in consumer prefer-
ences or an inability to manufacture a product profitably. A
115. MASS. CONST. Amend. Art. II, § 6. Section 6 provides that:
Any city or town may ... exercise any power or function which the general
court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the consti-
tution or laws enacted by the general court ... and which is not denied,
either expressly or by clear implication, to the city or town by its charter.
116. The New Bedford Memorandum pursues a detailed analysis of various re-
lated statutes and case law to arrive at this conclusion, an analysis that cannot be
repeated in detail here. See New Bedford Memorandum, supra note 106, at 20-33.
117. B. DOHERTY, supra note 89, at 17.
1990]
27
Schultz: The Use of Eminent Domain and Contractually Implied Property Righ
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
decision regarding which business to save depends in part on
local economic needs and on the potential profitability of
maintaining the business where it is located. Many profitable
businesses are closed simply because their investors are not
satisfied with their return on investment. The profitability of
these businesses may, however, be acceptable to a community
or to the employees of these businesses. Given these consider-
ations, each community will have to embark on a fairly sophis-
ticated financial analysis of a business before making the
decision whether to pursue ownership of that business through
eminent domain.
III. CONTRACTUALLY IMPLIED PROPERTY RIGHTS
Another innovative tool that could be used to prevent a
plant closing is for a community to assert the existence of a
property right in a business. This property right would oper-
ate to limit the business' ability to make unilateral decisions
that adversely affect the community's economic well-being.
The right would not be based exclusively upon appeals to
traditional legal conceptions of property, or upon contractu-
ally expressed property rights,' 8 but would be based upon con-
tractual metaphors that depict property rights in terms of
either social or mutual reliance relationships.
These types of arguments have been pressed in several re-
cent cases. In each, some variation of a breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, or contractually implied property right
argument was pursued. The final two of our four case studies
illustrate these arguments in action.
A. United Steel Workers
In United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 1330 v. United States
Steel Corp., the plaintiff union filed a suit seeking to keep the
defendant's plant open and operating."19 The basis of the
plaintiff's claim was alleged promises made by an employee of
118. For a recent example of a community's effort, based upon express (as opposed
to implied) contractual provisions, to maintain the operation of a business in a com-
munity, see In re Indenture of Trust Dated as of March 1, 1982, 437 NW.2d 430,
434-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
119. 492 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd in part, Local 1330, United Steel Workers
of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). The appellate
court affirmed the district court in all respects except for the antitrust claim which
was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. 631 F.2d at 1282-83.
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the defendant to keep the plant open so long as it remained
profitable. At issue were statements made by the plant man-
ager over an in-house recorded message system. This system
stored recorded messages and allowed employees to later hear
these messages on the system. Some of the statements made
included, for example: " 'With your help, this effort will con-
tinue and if and when there will be a phase-out depends on the
plants profitability .... "1
The plaintiffs alleged that, in response to and in reliance on
such statements, they "made a sincere and forceful effort to
increase productivity, or 'yield,' primarily by waiving those for-
mal technicalities of their labor contract that contributed to
easier working conditions, but detracted from productivity."' 2'
In support of the plaintiffs' contention that it relied on the
manager's profitability promise, the accounting reports indi-
cated that the corporation was earning consistent profits. 22
Late in 1979 United States Steel announced its plans to close
the plant. In December, 1979, the plaintiffs filed for, and were
granted in February, 1980, a temporary restraining order.
Trial on the merits began in March, 1980. In their complaint,
the plaintiffs suggested four theories in support of injunctive
relief: violation of antitrust statutes, property right, promissory
estoppel and breach of contract. 23 The three latter theories
will be addressed here.
The court noted that the breach of contract and detrimental
reliance claims were based on the telephone messages re-
corded by the plant manager. 24 Applying Ohio contract law
120. 492 F. Supp. at 5.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Specifically, "the gross profit margin for 1977 was $24,899,000.00, that for
1978 was $41,770,000.00, that for 1979 was $32,571,000.00 and ... the projected
gross profit margin for 1980 .... was $32,396,000.00." Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
Although the financial projections for 1980 indicated a gross profit, the court noted
that the overall projection for 1980 was a net loss of $9,387,000.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 4. In most, if not all, detrimental reliance claims the claims are based
upon reliance on an oral, as opposed to a written, promise. Promises not perform-
able within one year are required to be in writing, pursuant to the applicable Statute
of Frauds. When they are not the defendant may normally defend by claiming the
Statute of Frauds defense. Sometimes, however, the defendant may be equitably es-
topped from asserting this defense.
While the jurisdictions are divided on the issue, the majority appears to have
held that in some circumstances alleged oral contracts may be recognized under the
equitable or promissory estoppel theories despite the fact that they are otherwise
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the court concluded that the contract at issue must have been a
unilateral "promise-exchanged-for-an-act" contract, with the
telephone message representing the promise and the com-
pany's profitability representing the act.' 25 In finding these
facts did not give rise to a contract, the court noted that:
[A]t the time the alleged promise was made by the com-
pany, the workers did not immediately execute the contract
in full-profitability would have to be achieved over a long
'within the Statute of Frauds. See generally McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 112, 112,469
P.2d 177, 181 (1970) (court adopted the Restatement position to give "the necessary
latitude to relieve a party of the hardships of the Statute of Frauds"); Lovely v.
Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485, 489, 347 N.W.2d 752, 753 (1984) (court held that,
where the statute of frauds applies, promissory estoppel may preclude the defendant
from pleading the statute of frauds defense); Berg v. Carlstrom, 347 N.W.2d 809,
812-13 (Minn. 1984) (the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel may take an
agreement out of the statute of frauds); Olson v. Ronhovde, 446 N.W.2d 690,
692-93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (the court used the doctrines of equitable estoppel and
ratification to remove the claim from the statute of frauds); Nelson v. Smith, 349
N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (jury had sufficient evidence to find equitable
estoppel, but the court noted the doctrines of equitable and promissory estoppel may
be used to exempt an agreement from the statute of frauds); Klinke v. Famous Rec-
ipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 258-59, 616 P.2d 644, 646-47 (1980)
(court adopted the Restatement position using promissory estoppel to exempt an
agreement from the statute of frauds); Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621,
623-27, 220 P.2d 737, 739-42 (1980) (court applied the doctrine of estoppel to ex-
empt an agreement from the statute of frauds). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTS § 139 (1981), which states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the
Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly
cancellation and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action of forbear-
ance in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evi-
dence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms
are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable
by the promisor.
See also, Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 114 (1975). But see Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.,
190 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966) (court declined to adopt the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as a defense to the statute of frauds); Wright v. Smith, 105 R.I. 1, 2, 249
A.2d 56, 57 (1969) (the statute of frauds must be strictly complied with and the doc-
trine of quantum meruit will not be applied to avoid the statute).
125. United Steel Workers, 492 F. Supp. at 4-5.
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period of hard work. This means that the contract would
not come into existence until the workers had fully per-
formed their side of the contract by making the plant profit-
able. "[A unilateral] contract does not come into existence
until one party to it has done all that is necessary on his
part." 12
6
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' promissory estoppel
arguments. The court began its analysis of this argument by
noting the elements of a promissory estoppel claim 27 and then
shifted gears by correctly noting that "the formation of a
proper contract requires that the employee of the corporation
making a promise must have the authority to enter into the
contract."'' 28 Thusfor the court the issue became whether the
plant manager had the authority to make these types of
promises on behalf of the company. Applying agency concepts
in the promissory estoppel context, the court stated that "[t]he
lack of a technical power of agency in any of the company's
spokesmen does not relieve the company from a binding
promise if it should reasonably have expected the statements
of the spokesmen to be relied upon detrimentally by the work-
ers."' 129 The court found that no such reasonable reliance ex-
isted. In support of this conclusion the court stated that:
[A] reasonable understanding of all of the statements ...
would suggest that national company management wanted
to close the plant for lack of profitability and that the call for
increased worker productivity was a plan [the plant man-
ager] was presenting as a final effort for the workers to sway
national management opinion. [The plant manager's] plan
was courageous and well conceived, but it did not represent
a promise made by the corporation on which the workers
should reasonably have relied. 130
Finally, the court addressed the community right theory.
This theory had actually been suggested by the court itself dur-
ing a pre-trial conference. At the conference the court re-
126. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 5. The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: 1) that a promise
was made; 2) that the promisor should have reasonably expected to induce reliance
on the part of the promisee; 3) that the promisee did in fact rely on the promise; and
4) that the enforcement of the promise is necessary to prevent injustice. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
128. United Steel Workers, 492 F. Supp. at 5.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 6.
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quested the parties to brief "[t]he possibility of the
relationships between the steel industry and surrounding com-
munity generating a property right . *"... 31 Regarding this
suggestion, the court stated at the conference that:
"Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has
been happening for many years because of steel. Schools
have been built, roads have been built. Expansion that has
taken place is because of steel. And to accommodate that
industry, lives and destinies of the inhabitants of that com-
munity were based and planned on the basis of that institu-
tion: Steel.
But what has happened over the years between U.S. Steel,
Youngstown and the inhabitants? Hasn't something come
out of that relationship, something that out of which-not
reaching for a case on property law or a series of cases but
looking at the law as a whole, the Constitution, the whole
body of law, not only contract law, but tort, corporations,
agency, negotiable instruments-taking a look at the whole
body of American law and then sitting back and reflecting
on what it seeks to do, and that is to adjust human relation-
ships in keeping with the whole spirit and foundation of the
American system of law, to preserve property rights."' 3 2
Despite this initially encouraging signal to the plaintiffs, the
district court ultimately found "no legal basis for the finding of
a property right" because "[u]nfortunately, the mechanism...
to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in
the code of laws of our nation."' 3 3 The court deemed itself
bound to so rule even though it also felt that "United States
Steel should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area
devastated after drawing from the lifeblood of the community
for so many years."' 3 4 The court then concluded its commu-
nity property right discussion by noting that either the state or
federal legislature was the proper forum in which the right
131. Id. at 9.
132. Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (6th Cir. 1980). Even though the statements were originally
made at the district court level, the appellate court opinion is cited because it quotes
the actual statements from the pretrial conference.
133. United Steel Workers of Am., Local No. 1330 v. United States Steel Corp.,
492 F. Supp. 1, 10 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd in part, Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am.
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should be formally recognized.1 35
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed all
parts of the district court's opinion except the antitrust matter,
which was remanded. 1
36
B. City of Norwood
Another recent case that raised the contractually implied
property right theory was City of Norwood v. General Motors
Corp. '37 Although, as in United Steel Workers, the plaintiff in City
of Norwood was ultimately unsuccessful in arguing its property
right theory, the case is notable for its full factual and legal
development of the theory.
Norwood is a suburb of Cincinnati, Ohio. General Motors
Corp. (GM) first established an assembly plant in Norwood in
1923. This facility grew continuously over the years until, by
the 1980's, it employed over 4,200 people. As such, GM was
the largest employer in Norwood. In November, 1986, GM an-
nounced, "without warning," that the plant would close in
1988 and that all operations would be moved to Van Nuys,
California. 13 8
The City of Norwood responded to this announcement by
filing a suit against GM. In this case, however, the City did not
seek to prevent the closing per se, but, instead, sought dam-
ages to compensate for public money already spent in reliance
that the employer would remain in the city and for the huge
decrease in tax reserves anticipated on GM's departure. In
other words, the suit was filed to obtain transitional economic
help from GM. 139
Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint focuses on the fact that
the City of Norwood encouraged the growth of the Norwood
135. Id.
136. Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). The antitrust matter involved the refusal of U.S. Steel to
sell its Ohio and McDonald steel plants to the United Steel Workers. Thus, U.S.
Steel " 'exercised monopoly power' for the purpose of preventing a potential com-
petitor from entering the steel market." Id. at 1282. The circuit court was unable to
decide the issue based on the facts presented and, therefore, remanded the issue to
the lower court for further proceedings. Id. at 1283.
137. No. A-8705920 (Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio 1988).
138. Plaintiff's Complaint and Jury Demand at 2-3, City of Norwood v. General
Motors Corp. (Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio 1988) (No. A-
8705920).
139. Complaint at 10-12.
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plant by granting GM numerous concessions, including vacat-
ing streets around the plant, building bridges for the plant's
exclusive use, city assistance in acquiring real property and,
"in general, doing anything that General Motors re-
quested."' 140 Furthermore, the City noted that it derived
nearly one-third of its tax revenues from GM and that, in antic-
ipation of GM's departure, it had already instituted immediate,
emergency cost saving measures. The measures included
"[e]limination of the City's Waste Collection Department; ...
the elimination of most liability insurance coverage; ... [and] a
thirty percent (30%) increase in water rates .... ,,141 Finally,
the complaint's introductory matters are concluded by the
statement that:
The overwhelming size of General Motors' Norwood plant,
in relation to all other businesses in the City of Norwood,
conferred upon the General Motors Corporation a virtual
monopoly of power in its dealings with the City of Nor-
wood, such dealings including General Motors' requests for
concessions. Other American automakers, such as Chrysler
Corporation, having comparable relationships with cities in
which major plants are located, have recognized their posi-
tion of power and at the time of plant closings have offered
generous transitional aid to the affected communities and
have paid all obligations due the communities. The De-
fendant, General Motors Corporation, has refused to act in
a like manner.
142
Although seven causes of action were alleged in the plain-
tiff's complaint, only two will be addressed here. 143, The plain-
140. Complaint at 3.
141. Complaint at 5.
142. Complaint at 6-7.
143. Complaint at 7-11, 13-21. The other five causes of action were based on
nuisance, breach of equitable fiduciary duty, fraud and misrepresentation, vacation of
city streets, and failure to withhold earnings tax. Of interest here are the equitable
fiduciary duty and fraud and misrepresentation arguments.
In the breach of equitable fiduciary duty claim the City noted that GM's size and
position in the community conferred upon it a monopoly of power in its dealings
with the City. Consequently, GM had a special and confidential relationship with the
City and a concomitant equitable fiduciary relationship with regard to its dealings
with the City. The City claimed that this special fiduciary obligation required GM to
treat the City fairly in the event it chose to terminate the relationship. Complaint at
14-15.
In dismissing this claim the court held that the relationship between the City and
GM never rose to the level of a fiduciary relationship. The court noted that under
applicable rules "[fliduciaries are of two general classes, those who are formally ap-
[Vol. 16
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss2/2
EMINENT DOMAIN
tiff alleged that a contract arose between it and GM by virtue of
the operation of promissory estoppel, and that the defendant,
by closing the plant, would breach the contract. 144 The con-
tract arose, according to the City, over the course of a sixty-
four year long relationship between the parties, by virtue of
the City granting GM numerous concessions upon the express
and implied promise of GM that it would keep its plant in Nor-
wood. The City claimed that it had relied, to its detriment,
upon the defendant's actions and misrepresentations over the
course of this relationship.
14 5
The City's other main cause of action lay in equitable estop-
pel. The City claimed that, through the course of its relation-
ship with GM, GM had made numerous and repeated
representations to the City and had acted in such a manner so
as to lead the City to believe that GM would keep the facility in
Norwood. Based upon this state of affairs the City claimed that
GM "should be equitably estopped from denying any alleged
pointed in judicial proceedings, and those who acquire their character by some natu-
ral, consensual, or other relationship, rather than formal appointment." City of
Norwood v. General Motors Corp., No. A-8705920, slip op. at 10 (Court of Common
Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, 1988) (citation omitted)). "A fiduciary relationship
may be created out of an informal relationship, but this is done only when both parties
understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed." Id. at 10-11 (em-
phasis in original) (citing Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286,
390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1979)). Finally, the court noted, "[a] fiduciary has been de-
fined as a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the
benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking." Id. at 11 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
Applying these rules to the facts before it, the court stated that "[t]here are no
facts pled that would support plaintiff's conclusion that defendant had put itself in a
position of a fiduciary obligation to the City. Furthermore, plaintiff pleads no facts
indicating that GM acted primarily for the benefit of the City." Id. (emphasis in origi-
nal).
The court also discussed the plaintiff's fraud and misrepresentation claim. In so
doing, the court stated that " '[t]o constitute fraud, based upon false statements, the
false representations must be as to material matters of present or past, and cannot be
based on representations concerning future purpose or expectations.' " Id. at 12-13
(quoting Schuster Electric Co. v. Hamilton County Stores, Inc., 61 Ohio App. 331,
334, 22 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1939)). Relying on GM's alleged statement, as recorded in
the plaintiff's complaint, that it " 'would retain active manufacturing facilities in the
City of Norwood,' " the court noted the word "would" represents future action, not
past or present as required by the rules. Id. at 13. Consequently, this claim was
dismissed.
The remaining claims will not be addressed here because they are not relevant to
the present topics.
144. For the elements of a promissory estoppel claim, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS, supra note 127.
145. Complaint at 10-11, Norwood (No. A-8705920).
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intention to retain active manufacturing facilities in the City of
Norwood .... "146
For the above and all other claims the plaintiff determined it
had been damaged to the extent of $318,250,000.147
General Motors responded to the plaintiff's claim by filing a
Joint Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.
The court responded to the defendant's motion by essentially
dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims. 148 The Norwood City
Council later decided not to appeal the decision.'
49
The court dismissed the promissory estoppel claim by con-
cluding that none of GM's alleged explicit or implicit promises
to keep the plant open actually constituted a promise made by
the defendant. The court reasoned that "even under the most
liberal of interpretations" GM's actions never constituted a
promise to keep a manufacturing plant in Norwood. 50 Since
the plaintiff's claim was that a promise existed, this claim had
to fail.
Next the court dismissed the equitable estoppel claim, find-
ing that "[e]quitable estoppel does not of itself create a new
right or give a new cause of action."' 15' To invoke an equitable
estoppel claim, the plaintiff must assert that it relied on past or
present representations by the defendant; promises to perform
an act in the future do not meet the reliance element that is
required.1 2 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that GM's repre-
sentations had led the City to believe that GM "would retain
active manufacturing facilities within the City of Norwood."' 53
146. Complaint at 13.
147. Complaint at 18 ($56 million for loss of tax revenue and commerce, $9 mil-
lion for the increase in fire and police protection, $750,000 for the underpass con-
struction, $2,500,000 for rededicating previously vacated city streets and $250
million in punitive damages).
148. City of Norwood v. General Motors Corp., No. A-8705920, slip op. at 16
(Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, 1988). Six of the seven claims
were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The re-
maining claim having to do with GM's handling of hazardous materials was
remanded.
149. Letter from Robert G. Kelly, City Law Director, to David Schultz (Dec. 1,
1988).
150. Norwood, slip op. at 7.
151. Id. at 9. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 2.3, at 42 (1973)
stating that "estoppel is, according to the usual statement, a shield, not a sword. It
does not furnish a basis for damages claims, but a defense against the claim by the
estopped party."
152. Norwood, slip op. at 10.
153. Plaintiff's Complaint and Jury Demand at 11, City of Norwood v. General
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The court noted that since GM's declarations clearly related to
future events, the equitable estoppel requirement of past or
present fact was not met and the plaintiff's claim must fail. 154
C. Thoughts and Conclusions on Contractually Implied
Property Rights
Despite judicial reluctance to recognize the claimed contrac-
tually implied property rights asserted in the City of Norwood
and United Steel Workers cases, the authors believe there are
grounds to conclude that these rights may eventually be recog-
nized by the courts. Most notable in this regard was the dis-
trict court's query in United Steel Workers whether something
had come out of the relationship between Youngstown, Ohio
and U.S. Steel that requires U.S. Steel to fulfill its obligations
to the city. This statement, and its reaffirmation in the appel-
late court's opinion, suggests that both courts truly felt dis-
turbed by the resolution of the matter. 155 Both courts, in a
seemingly apologetic tone, stated that under the current state
of the law they felt constrained to hold as they did. 56 Both
courts also believed that formulating public policy on plant
closing issues is clearly the responsibility of state legislatures
or of Congress. 57 This, we feel, is an arguable conclusion.
There is no denying that, had the City of Norwood and United
Steel Workers courts held in the various plaintiffs' favor, these
rulings would have signaled a clear departure from traditional
contract and property concepts. Nevertheless, it is elementary
that in many cases when the court wishes to do what it knows
to be the right thing, it reasons by analogy from existing prece-
dent. City of Norwood and United Steel Workers presented oppor-
tunities for the courts to use this reasoning tool because:
[T]hus far, it is obvious that traditional contract theory and
legislative plant closing proposals cannot be expected to af-
Motors Corp. (Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio 1988) (No. A-
8705920).
154. Norwood, slip op. at 10.
155. The district court's analysis of the relationship that developed between the
City and U.S. Steel was discussed by the appellate court in Local 1330, United Steel
Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (6th Cir.
1980).
156. Id. at 1279-82; United Steel Workers of Am., Local No. 1330 v. United States
Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (1980).
157. 631 F.2d at 1282 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-39 (1934));
United Steel Workers, 492 F. Supp. at 10.
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ford optimum worker and community protection when a
major local employer decides to relocate or shut down. It is
therefore necessary for advocates to explore novel ap-
proaches to creating and saving community jobs.1
5 8
One commentator has recently argued (while acknowledging
the relative novelty of his argument) that the United Steel Work-
ers court could have held in the various plaintiffs' favor based
upon already existing law!
In "The Reliance Interest in Property" author Joseph Wil-
liam Singer argues that, contrary to the United Steel Workers de-
cisions, continued and sustained relationships can, in their
own right, give rise to property rights. 159 While acknowledg-
ing that the United Steel Workers courts would have had to inter-
pret the existing law in a new manner to grant the union's
claims, Singer asserts, nonetheless, that prior cases have found
property rights based on similar assertions. Further, in tort,
property, contract and family law, property interests have been
shifted and shared in situations that are analogous to plant
closings. 160 "These currently enforceable doctrines encom-
pass the full range of social relationships, from relations
among strangers, between neighbors, among long-term con-
tractual partners in the marketplace, among family members
and others in intimate relationships, and finally, between citi-
zens and the government."' 6' These relationships have given
rise to "reliance interests in property" which have resulted in
specific legal rules about, "for example, adverse possession,
prescriptive easements, public rights of access to private prop-
erty, tenants' rights, equitable division of property on divorce,
[and] welfare rights."' 162 What is most notable about all these
relationships is that:
At crucial points in the development of these relation-
ships-often, but not always, when they break up--the
legal system requires a sharing or shifting of property inter-
ests from the "owner" to the "non-owner" to protect the
more vulnerable party to the relationship. The legal system
requires this shift, not because of reliance on specific
158. Comment, supra note 7, at 233-34.
159. 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 621 (1988). The author is an Associate Professor of
Law at Boston University.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 622-23.
162. Id. at 622.
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promises, but because the parties have relied on each other
generally and on the continuation of their relationship.
Moreover, the more vulnerable party may need access to re-
sources controlled by the more powerful party, and the rela-
tionship is such that we consider it fair to place this burden
on the more powerful party by redistributing
entitlements. 1
63
Singer cautions the courts that "[c]onsideration of competing
interests in access to resources and past reliance on relation-
ships granting such access should be a central component of
any legal determination of how to allocate lawful power over
those resources."' 64 Based upon all of these already legally
recognized rules and principles, Singer asserts that the United
Steel Workers courts "had access to enforceable legal rules based
on principles that could have been seen as applicable prece-
dent for extension of existing law by creation of this new set of
entitlements." 165
There are no apparent reasons why these principles would
not be applicable in most, if not all, cases of plant closings. In
these cases there has usually been a continuous and mutual re-
lationship where severance most often leaves one party "vul-
nerable." In any particular case the strength of the property
claim would be contingent upon the duration and degree of
involvement in the relationship. These property rights do not
need a legislative construction; they can be created by the judi-
ciary in the same way other property and property-like inter-
ests have been.
Thus, while both the City of Norwood and the United Steel
Workers Union lost their battles, there is reason to believe that
some day the contractually implied property right will be judi-
cially recognized. This process will take time. The recognition
of the right will eventually put communities in a better position
to negotiate the conditions of both a company's entrance to
and exit from a community.
IV. CONTRACTUALLY IMPLIED PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT
DOMAIN IN MINNESOTA
Unfortunately, the contractually implied property rights ad-
163. Id. at 623.
164. Id. at 622.
165. Id. at 621.
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vocated here have not been recognized in Minnesota. This fact
alone would counsel against a plaintiff primarily relying on this
theory at this time in Minnesota.
The authors advocate, however, the advancement of these
rights in Minnesota even if, in so doing, the change in law is
significant. A party arguing for these rights has the option of
pursuing the reasoning presented in the Singer article, the City
of Norwood case, or the United Steel Workers cases.' 66
Minnesota municipalities may wish to litigate a plant closing
decision with the hope of an eventual recognition of a contrac-
tually implied property right. Municipalities may also assert
the existence of the right in order to improve their bargaining
positions with local companies. One method of helping mu-
nicipalities negotiate with corporations is to recognize that a
contract or property-like relationship was formed through tax
abatements, provision of essential services, and direct assist-
ance. This implied contract would define the relationship and
govern changes that would be permissable between the par-
ties. The primary goal is to prevent a business from creating
large-scale economic dislocation by leaving a town. However,
if this cannot be accomplished, the fallback goal is to recover
adequate compensation in return for the benefits provided in
reliance on a continued relationship.
Compared to contractually implied contract rights, the
stronger legal argument for Minnesota municipalities is using
eminent domain. Eminent domain provides municipalities
with a legal tool that is much more likely under current law to
accomplish the above-stated goals.
The beginning point for determining whether a particular
eminent domain "taking" is legal is always a state's constitu-
tion. The Minnesota Constitution provides that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken, destroyed, or damaged for public
use without just compensation therefor, first paid or se-
cured."' 67 The Minnesota judiciary has historically interpreted
this provision broadly, stating that "[t]he constitution should
receive no such narrow and technical construction."' 68 The
166. While the arguments and conclusions in this section are directed towards
Minnesota, similar arguments and conclusions concerning eminent domain and con-
tractually implied property rights may apply and be used in other states, subject to
local variation in specific state law and precedent.
167. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
168. Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515 (11 Gil.) 392, 414 (1866).
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Minnesota Legislature has been given broad authority to ac-
quire private property for various and novel uses, because
public use has been held to be a concept that " 'expands with
the new needs created by the advance of civilization.'
'[P]ublic use' is flexible and cannot be limited to concepts of
public use or purpose held at the time of the forming of the
constitution."169
This "flexible" approach to the use of eminent domain in
Minnesota allows using eminent domain to condemn a busi-
ness' assets to prevent removal of those assets. Minnesota law
indirectly supports this proposition through the practice of
condemning private property and then turning the property
over to another private entity for its further development. In
Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the statutory authority of the City of St.
Paul to condemn large tracts of already developed property
within the city and to then turn this private property over to
other private entities for their use.' 7 0 Noting that in this case
the condemnation process was used to eradicate city slums and
that such a purpose served a public use, the court stated that:
There are many authorities holding that various so-called
redevelopment statutes which provide for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, the expenditure of public
funds, and the lending of public credit are valid despite pro-
visions for the transfer of lands thus acquired by public au-
thority to private parties. The underlying reason for these
decisions is that the acquisition and clearing of blighted ar-
eas completely serves a public purpose. The subsequent
transfer of these lands to private parties is incidental to the
main public purpose.' 7 1
Thus, Greenman supports the conclusion that a public use is
served if a municipality condemns an on-going business, pur-
suant to a redevelopment statute, and then transfers the busi-
ness to another private owner.
In a similar vein, the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld
169. Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 404,
96 N.W.2d 673, 679 (1959) (quoting Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1, 16, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (1920)).
170. Greenman, 255 Minn. at 406-07, 96 N.W.2d at 681. The statute under consid-
eration was MINN. STAT. § 462.415 (1947) (repealed 1987, ch. 291, § 244).
171. Greenman, at 405, 96 N.W.2d at 680, As a notable authority, the court refer-
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the condemnation of all the assets of a privately owned transit
company in order that they be transferred to a public agency
for continued operation. In Twin Cities Metropolitan Public
Transit Area v. Twin City Lines, Inc., the issues before the court
were primarily asset valuation and inclusion or exclusion from
the condemnation award of certain assets.' 72 However, the
court also implicitly upheld the legality of condemning a pri-
vately owned business for transfer to another entity for subse-
quent operation. 173 This is precisely the use of eminent
domain we advocate here in regard to plant closings.
While redevelopment statutes are most often used to create
jobs and economic growth, the same power could arguably
serve the public by preserving jobs and maintaining a stable
economy. Support for this conclusion can be found in the re-
cent case of City of Duluth v. State.' 74 In City of Duluth, the City
used its eminent domain powers to condemn a large tract of
land. The purpose of the condemnation was to construct a pri-
vately owned paper mill, which would result in the public ben-
efit of long-term employment. 175 A condemnee, upon whose
land stood a large, mostly vacant building, objected to the
planned use of eminent domain. In upholding the City's exer-
cise of that power the court held that "[t]he revitalization of
deteriorating urban areas and the alleviation of unemployment
are certainly public goals."'' 76 In arriving at this conclusion the
172. 301 Minn. 386, 390, 224 N.W.2d 121, 123-24 (1974).
173. For cases similarly affirming the acquisition of private property under emi-
nent domain authority and its later distribution to other private parties, see City of
Shakopee v. Minnesota Valley Electric Cooperative, 303 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981)
(where the purpose is to transfer property, whether publicly or privately owned, the
determining legal factor is whether the public use and benefit increase enough to
justify its acqusition); Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. City of Fairmont, 243
Minn. 176, 180, 67 N.W.2d 41, 44-45 (1954) (MINN. STAT. § 117.01 (1954), involving
eminent domain, does not differentiate between real and personal property when the
property is operated as a whole).
174. 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).
175. Id. at 762. The eminent domain power was derived from both MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 13, and Duluth's Home Rule Charter, which provides, in pertinent part, that
the City may " 'take and hold, by purchase, condemnation, gift or devise, and lease
and convey any and all such real, personal or mixed property, .... as its purposes may
require or as may be useful or beneficial to its inhabitants.' " Id. at 767 (quoting
Duluth City Charter § 1). For the exercise of eminent domain under similar authori-
ties see the Morse Cutting Tool case and the IPR memorandum at supra notes 109-16
and accompanying text.
176. City of Duluth, 390 N.W.2d at 763.
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court relied 177 on the City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele t 78 case. In
Wurtele the court upheld the condemnation of parcels for the
construction of a privately owned downtown mall. In that case
the court deferred 79 to the city council's findings of how es-
sential a downtown mall was to maintaining a viable business
district in the city. A public purpose existed because evidence
showed the construction of the mall created employment, gen-
erated retail sales, and increased the tax base of a city.'
80
Should a Minnesota municipality attempt to exercise its emi-
nent domain power to preserve, rather than create employ-
ment? In answering this question, the judiciary must attempt
to distinguish between the two alternatives, labelling one a
public purpose and the other not. The authors argue that
there is no legally meaningful distinction between the two.
The Minnesota Supreme Court may also agree if faced with the
question, given the court's conclusion in City of Duluth, that a
public purpose is served by "provid[ing] permanent and tem-
porary employment in an economically distressed area of the
state."'' We maintain that, for eminent domain and public
177. The court noted its reliance on cases from other jurisdictions. The court
stated that "[a]ppellate courts in other jurisdictions have also determined that pro-
posals to condemn and transfer property from one private owner to another are justi-
fied on the ground that the economic benefit that results is 'public' in nature." Id. at
763 n.2 (citing Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171,
179, 339 A.2d 278, 283 (1975); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
410 Mich. 616, 634, 304 N.W.2d 455,459 (1981)). Also notable is that, in arriving at
its conclusion in this case the court relied on several cases discussed at length in this
paper, including Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) and Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (discussed supra notes 17-20 and 57-63
and in accompanying text).
178. 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980).
179. It is well-settled in Minnesota eminent domain law (as well as in other juris-
dictions) that thejudiciary's function in this area is narrow and limited. Thejudiciary
is to defer to the legislature's determinations regarding eminent domain.
[T]he exercise of the right of eminent domain and condemnation proceed-
ings in furtherance of that right are legislative functions of government.
The only questions which are judicial are the public use and the adequacy of
compensation.
3. It is within the province of the legislature to declare a public use or
purpose, subject of course to a review by the courts, and such determination
by the legislative body will not be overruled by the court except in instances
where that determination is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 403, 96
N.W.2d 673, 679 (1959) (citations omitted). See also supra notes 20, 33-35 and ac-
companying text.
180. City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Minn. 1980).
181. City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986).
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use purposes, only a distinction without a difference exists be-
tween the alleviation of unemployment and the prevention of
unemployment, between generating retail sales and preserving
them, and between enhancing a city's tax base and preserving
the same.
CONCLUSION
In the last twenty years the United State's economy has
shifted towards deindustrialization. This natural process of
economic evolution has brought with it a great deal of local-
ized hardship. In some cases, it has brought whole communi-
ties to their economic knees. In other cases, a limited number
of individuals within a community have faced the same result.
While in the end it is not economically healthy to artificially
impede this evolution, there may be tools available to commu-
nities that slow down or alter the process without unnecessa-
rily impeding it.
To accomplish these goals we have recommended that com-
munities use two tools that may be at their disposal. First, we
suggest using a municipality's eminent domain power to gain
control of assets. Depending on the specific authority, the
power can be used to purchase the assets, in particular the
plant, of a business that intends to either close altogether or
simply leave a particular town. In either case, the plant can
then be operated by the municipality itself or by a new private
entity after conveyance from the municipality.
We have also suggested that there exists between a company
and the community in which it resides certain contractually im-
plied property rights. These implied rights can be used by a
municipality to control the business' ability to make unilateral
decisions that harm the town. The recognition of these rights
could give rise to a claim for relief based upon concepts of an
implied contract through either equitable or promissory estop-
pel. In most cases, the equities of a given situation call out for
recognition of these arguments and the provision of some
remedy. Absent a remedy, municipalities are entirely at the
mercy of businesses and are consequently unable to plan for or
to control their destinies. Arguably, citizens have the right to
expect their governments to assure greater stability and pre-
dictability in the business sector.
We recognize that certain individuals may argue these tools
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are symbols of "creeping economic socialism." However, the
days of idealistic economic laissez-faire are long over. This
philosophy has been replaced by a highly regulated economy.
We believe that the economic hardship addressed here is, in
part, the direct result of the distinct advantage foreign nations
have achieved over the United States by regulating and plan-
ning their economies. While we do not advocate central plan-
ning, we do advocate some additional constraints on a
business' ability to abandon, responsibility-free, a town and its
citizens after using up their vitality. The suggestions made
here can be used to ensure a more just evolution in the law
governing these relationships.
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